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Abstract
The theoretical literature exploring various ramifications and applications of Tullock’s
Ž .1980 rent-seeking model is extensive and rapidly growing. In contrast, there exist as yet
only a few experimental evaluations of this model, with ambiguous results. Moreover, these
Ž .studies focus on one particular case proportional probabilities and use a problematic
experimental design. With an appropriate design we investigate the extreme cases of
proportional probabilities and perfect discrimination, which offer the starkest contrast in
theoretical predictions. We find substantial evidence for the predictive power of the
rent-seeking model, particularly if one allows for the fact that people sometimes make
mistakes or are confused about what to do. q 1998 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights
reserved.
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1. Introduction
In remarkable contrast to the extensive and rapidly growing theoretical litera-
Ž .ture on rent seeking see Nitzan, 1994 , there are as yet only very few experimen-
tal evaluations of this theory. This is unfortunate, because the method of labora-
tory experimentation appears particularly useful here. The basic rent-seeking
Ž .model due to Tullock 1980 lends itself readily to experimental implementation,
which offers the possibility of a controlled and replicable investigation of the
model’s properties. Moreover, direct empirical evidence on rent seeking is hard to
come by, due to the very nature of the lobbying process. Hence the importance of
laboratory work.
The basic model involves two competing agents expending resources to influ-
ence the probability of acquiring a given rent. The probability that agent 1 gets the
rent with expenditure x, given that agent’s 2 expenditure is y, follows from the
 < 4 R Ž Rexogenous choice of R in the function: P 1 wins with x 2 spends y sx r x
R.qy , with Ps0.5 if xsys0. The higher is R, the more discriminatory the
Ž .game becomes. In fact, taking lim of P it shows that P becomes 0 1 ifR ™`
Ž . Žx- ) y, in which case the contest has become perfectly discriminatory Ps0.5
.if xsy . Solutions to the game with R-2, and Rs` are known from Tullock
Ž . Ž .1980 and Hillman and Samet 1987 , respectively. Only recently the solution to
Ž .the case 2-R-` has been characterized Baye et al., 1994 . When RF2 there
is a pure strategy Nash equilibrium, when R)2 the equilibrium is necessarily in
mixed strategies. The rent-seeking literature is not only concerned with the
existence of Nash equilibria, however, but also with its characterization and ‘‘in
particular, with the relationship between total rent-seeking outlays in equilibrium
Ž .and the value of the contested rent’’ Nitzan, 1994 . In this context, the following
Ž .definitions are helpful. Let the expected rate of dissipation ERD be defined by
the ratio of the expected sum of the rent-seeking expenditures and the value of the
Ž .rent. Moreover, define the expected rate of overdissipation ERO as EROsERD-
Ž .1. Furthermore, let the expected incidence of overdissipation EIO be defined as
the expected frequency by which the sum of the expenditures exceed the value of
the rent. For a continuous strategy space, if R-2 it turns out that ERO-0 and
EIOs0, whereas if Rs` it follows that EROs0 and EIO)0. For the
intermediate cases, 2-R-`, we have that EROF0 and EIO)0. Consequently,
the starkest contrast in terms of these dissipation ratios is between the cases Rs1
Ž . Ž .proportional probabilities and Rs` perfect discrimination .
As of today there exist only four related experimental investigations of the
Ž .basic rent-seeking model. Millner and Pratt 1989 investigate the cases Rs1 and
Rs3. However, instead of using an appropriate, simultaneous single decision
design, they allowed sequential decisions within a given time interval. Moreover,
they mistakenly arrived at a pure strategy solution for Rs3, leading to a wrong
Ž .evaluation of the results for this case. Later, Millner and Pratt 1991 have argued
that the discrepancy between the theoretical prediction for Rs1 and their
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experimental results, showing dissipation in excess of the Nash prediction, can be
Ž .explained by risk aversion. Shogren and Baik 1991 re-examined the case Rs1
with a new experimental design utilizing an explicit expected payoff matrix. 1 The
matrix, provided to the subjects, shows the expected outcome of all alternative
Ž .choices expenditure levels given the opponent’s choice. Their results seem
consistent with the theoretical predictions. Unfortunately, by having subjects
repeatedly play against the same opponent, their design too is not in line with the
theoretical model. In a repeated game cooperation through lower expenditure is
2 Ž .facilitated, and this may partly explain their results. Davis and Reilly 1998 ,
finally, investigate the effects of rent defending buyer behavior as in Ellingsen
Ž .1991 . Their base cases are, however, without the rent defending activity and
concern Rs1 and Rs`. 3 They find that dissipation is indeed significantly
larger for the latter case, but for both cases persistently and substantially above the
Nash prediction. Moreover, there appears to be no significant difference in
behavior between experienced and inexperienced subjects. Their design is prob-
lematic, though, for the following reasons. First of all, their experimental setup is
such that agents are cash constrained. This affects the equilibrium spending
Ž .behavior see Che and Gale, 1997 . Furthermore, they have four agents participat-
ing in the rent-seeking game. With more than two competing agents there are
Ž .multiple Nash equilibria see Baye et al., 1996 , so that straight-forward behav-
ioral predictions cannot be obtained from the theory. Moreover, their base cases
were run together with other treatments in two-sequence sessions, with only half
of the relevant sessions having the base case first in the sequence. Because of the
small number of sessions, their analysis uses aggregate results and may, therefore,
be affected by a sequence effect.
Motivated by the wide use of the rent-seeking model and the problems with the
few existing experimental studies, this paper investigates the results of an experi-
mental implementation which we believe to better reflect the nature of the
theoretical models. Since the starkest contrast in terms of theoretical predictions is
between the cases Rs1 and Rs`, we focus on these two extremes. As in
Ž .Shogren and Baik 1991 , an explicit expected earnings table is used to ease the
informational problem for the subjects. Section 2 presents the theoretical predic-
tions and experimental design. Results are analyzed in Section 3, and Section 4
concludes.
1 Shogren and Baik wrongly suggest the absence of a Nash equilibrium for R)2.
2 It should be noted, furthermore, that only 10 pairs of subjects participated in their experiment.
3 We became aware of this work after having run some pilot sessions with a somewhat different
design in 1994.
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2. Theory and design
Consider the simultaneous move, complete information Tullock allocation
mechanism without cash constraints. We give the theoretical solutions for the
cases Rs1 and Rs`, which are implemented in the experiment. The value of
Ž . Ž .the rent ‘prize’ in the experiment is taken to be 13. Agents can bid buy tokens
Ž .in units of 1, starting from 0, and up to 15 their endowment . In the experiment,
the endowment, prize, and tokens were counted in ‘points’ with each point paying
5 Dutch cents; see the Instructions in Appendix A. Because of the discrete nature
of the experiment, the theoretical solutions are given for a discrete strategy
space. 4
2.1. Case Rs1
The expected earnings table for this case is reproduced in Appendix A as part
of the instructions. From this table it is easily seen that irrespective of the choice
of the opponent, it never pays to bid more than 3. Some further elimination shows
that the unique Nash equilibrium is for both agents to bid 3. Expected earnings for
this equilibrium are 15-3q1r2.13s18.5. Note that this is a pure strategy
equilibrium. Hence, the variance of the bids is zero. The expected dissipation
equals 3q3s6, and therefore ERDs6r13s0.46, EROsy0.54, and EIOs0.
2.2. Case Rs`
The expected earnings table for this case is also reproduced in Appendix A. For
the continuous strategy space the unique equilibrium is for both agents to draw
w xtheir bids randomly from the uniform distribution on the interval 0, 13 ; see
Ž . Ž .Hillman and Samet 1987 and Baye et al. 1996 . In the discrete strategy space
with gridsize 1, there is a unique equilibrium if the size of the rent Q is odd, and a
Ž . Ž . 5multiplicity if it is even.; see Bouckaert et al. 1992 and Schep 1995 . For this
reason we have chosen Qs13 in the experiment, to ensure that the results are not
confounded by a multiplicity of equilibria. Let p , with is0,1, . . . ,12, denote thei
probability that a certain point in the grid is drawn. In equilibrium p s1r13 fori
w xall i; that is, bids are drawn from the discrete uniform on the interval 0, 12 . This
implies an expected bid of 6, and a variance of the bids equal to 14.0 and hence a
standard deviation of 3.74. Furthermore, expected earnings equal 15-6q1r2.13
s15.5. It is immediate from the above that expected dissipation equals 12,
ERDs12r13, and EROsy1r13. The expected incidence of overdissipation,
4 Ž .The results for a continuous strategy space can be found in, e.g., Tullock 1980 , Hillman and
Ž . Ž .Samet 1987 and Baye et al. 1996 ; these are quite similar to the discrete strategy space solutions.
5 Ž . Ž .All equilibria are obtained in Bouckaert et al. 1992 , and uniqueness was proved by Schep 1995 ;
Ž .see also Baye et al. 1994 for a summary in English.
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EIO, can be calculated as follows. For the respective bids x and y we have from
Ž .  4 Ž . 2 Schep 1995 : P xqys2Qy j s jy1 rQ , js2, . . . ,Qq1, and P xqys
4 Ž . 2  4j s jq1 rQ , js0, . . . ,Qy1. It follows that EIOsP xqy)13 s66r169
f0.39.
The following hypotheses are generated by the theory and will be tested against
Ž .the experimental data. We start out with some quantitative point predictions
regarding the distribution of bids for Rs1 and Rs`. Since predictions concern-
ing ERD and EIO are implied, we do not mention these explicitly.
( )2.3. QuantitatiÕe point predictions
Ž .Hypothesis 1a: With Rs1 proportional probabilities the distribution of bids
is concentrated on 3.
Ž .Hypothesis 1b: With Rs` perfect discrimination the distribution of bids is
w xuniform on 0, . . . ,12 , with an average bid of 6 and a standard deviation of
3.74.
A weaker test of the theory, which may be called for due to the possible
presence of factors that have not been modeled, involves the use of theoretical
Ž .predictions in a qualitative directional sense. Assuming that the background
noise caused by these omitted variables is uncorrelated with the value of R, one
would at least expect to find empirical support for the following qualitative
predictions.
( )2.4. QualitatiÕe directional predictions
Ž .Hypothesis 2a: Mean bid and dissipation D are lower for Rs1 than for
Rs`.
Hypothesis 2b: Variance of bids and dissipation are smaller for Rs1 than for
Rs`.
Ž .Hypothesis 2c: Incidence of overdissipation IO is smaller for Rs1 than for
Rs`.
The experiment was run at the computerized CREED-laboratory of the Univer-
sity of Amsterdam. Students were recruited through announcements on bulletin
boards. In total five sessions were run with the treatment Rs1, and four with the
treatment Rs`. In each session—which took about one hour—either 12 or 14
subjects participated. About 50% of the participants were undergraduate eco-
nomics students, while most of the other participants studied social geography,
chemistry or psychology. No subject had any prior experience with this type of
experiment. Upon arrival in the reception room of the laboratory a short introduc-
tion was read, and subjects drew an envelope containing a table number before
entering the lab. Once seated in the lab, at tables with partitions, the instructions
6 Žwere distributed and read aloud. Apart from the two practice rounds with no real
6 Ž .Remarks made by subjects on a Remarks sheet suggest that the instructions were extremely clear.
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Table 1
Statistics of bids
Statistic r s1 r s`
Ž . Ž .Mean 5.05 4.50 5.96 5.87
Ž . Ž .Median 4.00 4.00 6.00 6.00
Ž . Ž .Mode 3.00 3.00 10.00 1.00
Ž . Ž .Standard deviation 3.30 2.84 3.78 3.89
Ž . Ž .No. bids 1980 660 1500 500
Statistics for all 30 periods. Between parentheses for the last 10 periods.
.money at stake , each session consisted of 30 rounds of play. In each round
subjects were first randomly matched in pairs, to retain the one-shot character of
the game. Subjects then obtained an endowment of 15 points and were requested
Ž .to type in how many points they wanted to spend on tokens at 1 point per token
to win a prize of 13 points. They could use the expected earnings table in the
instructions for making this decision. Subsequently, the computer determined the
winner either through a lottery or by checking who spent most, depending on the
treatment. Net earnings in points determined the payment for the round via the
exchange rate 1 points5 cents. Subjects could look up the results of previous
rounds in a record table on their screen, showing the number of tokens they
themselves and their opponents bought, the probability of winning, the winner,
Ž .and their total earnings. At the end of a session subjects were paid out one by
one, in private. Average earnings over the one hour experiment amounted to 25.49
guilders for Rs1 and 23.67 guilders for Rs`. In US-dollars, at the time of the
Ž .experiment April 1996 , these figures approximately equaled $15.35 and $14.25,
respectively.
3. Results
ŽTables 1 and 2 present some general statistics concerning bids number of
.tokens bought and dissipation, while Figs. 1 and 2 show the frequency distribu-
Table 2
Statistics of dissipation
Statistic r s1 r s`
Ž . Ž .Mean 10.10 9.00 11.92 11.74
Ž . Ž .Median 9.00 8.50 12.00 12.00
Ž . Ž .Mode 8.00 8.00 11.00 12.00
Ž . Ž .Standard deviation 4.78 4.09 5.39 5.31
Ž . Ž .Incidence of overdissipation 0.206 0.127 0.379 0.348
Ž . Ž .No. observations 990 330 750 250
Statistics for all 30 periods. Between parentheses: for the last 10 periods.
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Ž .Fig. 1. Frequency distribution of bids all rounds .
tions of the bids for the two treatments. From the figures it is immediate that the
theoretical predictions are rejected by the data if one were to take these in a strict
sense. In case of Rs1 all bids should be at 3, but instead they range from 1 to
15. Note that spending more than 12 can never be profitable. Similarly, for Rs`
Ž .Fig. 2. Frequency distribution of bids last 10 rounds .
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no bids should be observed above 12, but individual monetary overdissipation
does occur with bids of 14 and 15. Moreover, statistical tests indicate that the
mean is significantly different from 3 in case of Rs1, and that the null of a
w xuniform distribution on 0, 12 is rejected in case of Rs`, independently of
whether we use all rounds or only the last ten rounds. 7 We conclude that the
Ž .quantitative point predictions of hypotheses 1a and 1b are rejected by the data.
Ž .Before turning to the qualitative directional predictions we should note the
following, however. First of all, we can reject the hypothesis that the observed
Žbids for Rs1 and Rs` are drawn from the same distribution at p-0.001,
.using a Kolmogorov–Smirnov test . Furthermore, observe for Rs1 from Figs. 1
and 2, and Table 1, that the mode is stable at 3 and that the distribution of bids
becomes more concentrated around 3 over time. 8 Moreover, for Rs` statistical
Ž .tests do not reject the hypothesis that the mean bid is 6 using a sign test or t-test ;
note, furthermore, that the median is exactly 6 and that the standard deviation is
very close to the predicted level. In addition, in this treatment there is no clear
convergence to a unimodal distribution of bids over time. In fact, it turns out that
for 3 of the 4 sessions of this treatment the observed bids become more in line
Žwith a uniform distribution when comparing the rounds 21–30 with 1–10 that is,
.the z-scores of a Kolmogorov–Smirnov test decrease . Finally, note from Fig. 3,
that the development of dissipation is suggestive for the predictive power of the
theoretical model, at least in a qualitative comparative statics sense. For Rs` the
Žlevel of dissipation fluctuates around the theoretical prediction of 12 observe from
Table 2 that the incidence of overdissipation is close to the predicted level of
.0.39 . For Rs1 dissipation is persistently too high but, after the first eight
periods, its development shows a clear tendency towards the predicted level of 6.
Ž .We turn now to the qualitative directional predictions of hypotheses 2a–c. We
Ž . 9focus on the independent session aggregates for the last 10 rounds; see Table 3.
Using a Mann–Whitney U test, the following outcomes are obtained. Firstly, we
find that the mean bid and dissipation are significantly smaller for Rs1 than for
Rs`, in line with hypothesis 2a. Secondly, it appears that the variance of bids
and dissipation are, as predicted, smaller for Rs1 than for Rs`, albeit the
difference is only marginally significant in both cases. Thus, we find some support
7 A conservative sign test as well as a t-test rejects the hypothesis for Rs1 that the mean is 3
Ž .p-0.05 , taking session averages as observations. For Rs` we applied a Kolmogorov–Smirnov test
at the treatment, sessions, and individual level. The hypothesis of a uniform distribution is rejected at
p-0.001 for the treatment and sessions. At the individual level, the hypothesis is rejected at p-0.05
for all but 7 of the 50 subjects. Similarly, but with higher confidence, we find that the hypothesis of a
uniform bid distribution is rejected for Rs1.
8 Using a Kolmogorov–Smirnov test, it appears for all sessions of treatment Rs1 that the data
Žbecome less in line with a uniform distribution when comparing the rounds 21–30 with 1–10 that is,
.the z-scores increase .
9 Results are similar if we take the last 5 rounds.
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Fig. 3. Development of dissipation.
for hypothesis 2b. Finally, regarding the incidence of overdissipation, the results
show that there is also support for hypothesis 2c that IO is smaller for Rs1 than
for Rs`. All in all, there is clear evidence for the qualitative predictions of the
rent-seeking model regarding the extreme cases of proportional probabilities and
perfect discrimination.
4. Concluding discussion
Ž .Summarizing our results, we find that for Rs1 proportional probabilities the
mode of the bid distribution is clearly at the predicted level, and the distribution
becomes more concentrated around that level during the last ten rounds. The main
failure of the theoretical model is that it does not predict the persistently
Žhigher—albeit somewhat declining—level of dissipation. For Rs` perfect
.discrimination the bid distribution is strictly not uniform, but shows no clear
Žmode or convergence towards a unimodal distribution in fact, the distribution
.becomes rather more like a uniform distribution . Moreover, statistically it cannot
be rejected that the mean bid and dissipation level are as predicted, while the
median is exactly and the standard deviation and incidence of overdissipation are
Ž .almost at the predicted levels. Finally, all qualitative directional predictions are
supported by the data. Mean bid and dissipation, the variance of bids and
dissipation, as well as the incidence of overdissipation, are all smaller for Rs1





















Session aggregates on bids, dissipation, and incidence
Session All 30 rounds Last 10 rounds
mean bidrD sd bid sd D Inc mean bidrD sd bid sd D Inc
r s1 1 9.40 2.09 2.98 0.094 9.52 1.77 2.24 0.033
2 12.78 4.80 6.68 0.500 10.67 4.60 6.45 0.400
3 10.78 2.21 2.97 0.183 9.75 2.37 3.37 0.133
7 9.76 3.27 4.67 0.152 8.30 2.09 3.01 0.057
8 7.78 2.54 3.62 0.076 6.94 1.80 2.58 0.000
Average 10.10 2.98 4.18 0.201 9.04 2.52 3.53 0.125
r s` 4 11.99 3.90 5.31 0.390 13.46 4.33 5.67 0.471
5 13.86 3.70 5.19 0.522 11.37 4.32 5.58 0.350
6 11.25 4.11 5.76 0.328 10.45 3.53 4.87 0.233
9 10.55 3.12 4.72 0.272 11.40 3.04 4.45 0.317
Average 11.91 3.71 5.25 0.378 11.67 3.81 5.14 0.343
Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž .Diff. r s1 vs. r s` 4 0.096 5 0.143 4 0.096 3 0.056 1 0.016 4 0.096 4 0.096 3 0.056
Mann–Whitney
Ž .U one-tailed sign.
D stands for dissipation, sd for standard deviation, and Inc for incidence of overdissipation.
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rather close to the Nash-equilibrium predictions, particularly for the perfect
discrimination treatment: 25.49 vs. 27.75 guilders for Rs1, and 23.67 vs. 23.25
guilders for Rs`. 10
So, why this ‘excessive’ dissipation under proportional probabilities, whereas
dissipation is as predicted under perfect discrimination? First, observe that the
Ž .suggestion of Millner and Pratt 1991 that the deviation may be due to risk-aver-
Žsion is not supported by our data. In that case we should have found a lower than
. 11the Nash equilibrium dissipation level for Rs`. The outcome for this
treatment rather suggests that subjects were almost risk-neutral. Suppose, however,
that subjects make mistakes or search randomly if they are not sure about their
analysis of the problem. This can be modeled by adding uniformly distributed
noise to the Nash solution. Observe that this would affect the Rs1 case, but not
the Rs` solution. For Rs1 fewer bids can be selected below the predicted level
of 3 than above that level, whereas for Rs` the support is symmetric around the
predicted average of 6. Consequently, this would affect the results precisely in the
direction found, with a median and mean above the equilibrium prediction for the
former case and at the predicted level for the latter.
A similar reasoning has been applied to explain observed ‘excessive’ contribu-
tions in public good experiments, where often contributing nothing is theoretically
Ž .a dominant strategy e.g., Andreoni, 1995 . Apart from confusion, this literature
Žhas also pointed to altruistic or cooperative motives for the observed behavior see
.Ledyard, 1995 . In our case these alternative explanations are not very helpful,
since they would lead to lower instead of higher bids. They also would affect the
equilibrium predictions for both of our treatments similarly, counter to what we
observe in our experiment. For the same reason, envy or spite cannot explain our
results either.
Our conclusion is that the rent-seeking model has predictive power, particularly
if one allows for the fact that people sometimes make mistakes or are confused
about what to do. Remarks left by participants on their Remark sheets suggest that
there are three categories of subjects. The first type behaves as ‘gamesmen’; they
appear to understand the strategic nature of the game and behave accordingly. The
second type is confused and basically randomizes, whereas the third type adapts to
the outcomes of earlier rounds. The third type seems to constitute a substantial
10 Ž .The Pareto-efficient cooperative outcome, implying the purchase of zero tokens and a probability
of 1r2 of winning the prize, would have led to earnings of 32.25 guilders.
11 This result is independent of the sign of the third derivative of the utility function. Incidentally,
Millner and Pratt have to assume that this derivative is negative to explain their results for Rs1,
Žwhich runs counter to the implied assumption for the usual classes of utility functions e.g., CARA,
.CRRA, and also DARA . The stable mode at 3 and the development of dissipation in the direction of 6
in our experiment also plead against this explanation.
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Žgroup, making recent research efforts to model this type of behavior see, e.g.,
.Roth and Erev, 1995 of interest and importance for the future study of rent-seek-
ing behavior.
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( )Appendix A. Instructions translated in English
The instructions concern the treatment Rs1, with adaptations for Rs` in
w xbold brackets . .
A.1. Introduction
This is an experimental study of decision making. Various research institutions
have financially contributed to this study. The instructions are simple. If you
follow them carefully you can earn a substantial amount of money. All the money
you earn is for you to keep. Your earnings will be paid to you in cash, privately
and confidentially, immediately after the experiment. We will first go through the
instructions. Subsequently, you will get the opportunity to raise questions.
A.2. Decisions and earnings
The experiment consists of thirty rounds. In each round you will be matched
with one other participant.
In each round a lottery decides which one of you two will win a prize. The
probability that you win the prize is dependent on the number of tokens that you
buy and the number of tokens that the other participant buys. More precisely, the
probability that you win the prize equals the ratio of the number of tokens that you
buy and the sum of the tokens that you and the other participant buy. If you buy X
tokens and the participant to whom you are matched with buys Y tokens, then the
( )J. Potters et al.rEuropean Journal of Political Economy 14 1998 783–800 795
Ž .probability that you win the prize equals Xr XqY , while the probability that
Ž .the other participant wins the prize equals Yr XqY . Suppose, for example, that
you buy the same number of tokens as the other participant. In that case XsY
and the probability that you win the prize equals 1r2, while the probability that
Žthe other participant wins the prize is also 1r2. For the sake of completeness, a
.probability of 1r2 also holds if neither of you buys any tokens, so that XsYs0.
Note that the probabilities sum up to 1. Consequently, always one of you will win
the prize.
wIn each round one of you will win a prize. Which one of you will win the
prize depends on the number of tokens that you buy and the number of tokens that
the other participant buys. More precisely, the one who has bought more tokens
than the other participant to whom he or she is matched with in a round wins the
prize. Thus, if you buy X tokens and the participant you are matched with buys Y
tokens, then you will win the prize if X is larger than Y, while the other
participant wins the prize if X is smaller than Y. In case you buy the same number
Ž .of tokens as the other participant XsY , the computer will perform a lottery in
which the probability that you win the prize equals 1r2, and the probability that
Žthe other participant wins the prize is also equal to 1r2. For the sake of
completeness, a probability of 1r2 also holds if neither of you buys any tokens, so
.that XsYs0. Note that the probabilities sum up to 1. Consequently, always one
xof you will win the prize.
You will not actually receive the tokens you buy. In each round the computer
will record the decisions of all participants and for each pair perform a drawing
Ž . wlottery in accordance with the number of tokens bought. . . . and for each pair
xdetermine who has won the prize. When you make your decision you will not
know the decision of the other participant. Once the round is over, you will be
informed about the number of tokens the other participant bought and the winner
of the prize. You will not know the participant whom you are matched with in a
round. Furthermore, in each round the participant with whom you are paired with
will change. The matching scheme has been randomly determined by us in
advance.
Earnings in a round are in points. At the end of the experiment you will be
paid 5 cents for each point you have earned. At the start of each round each
participant will get an endowment of 15 points. Then, everyone decides how many
tokens to buy, at a cost of 1 point per token. Winning the prize will earn you 13
points. If you win the prize your earnings in points equal: the endowment of 15
points minus the number of tokens you bought plus the prize of 13 points. If the
participant whom you are paired with wins the prize your earnings equal: the
endowment of 15 points minus the number of tokens you bought. The endowment
Ž . Ž . Ž .15 points , the prize 13 points , and the cost per token 1 point will stay the
same in each round.
To help you in making your decisions we have added a table to these
( )instructions showing your expected earnings in points . We ask you now to look
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at this table. Your expected earnings are equal to the endowment minus the
number of tokens you buy, plus the probability of winning times the prize. To
determine your expected earnings in case of a particular number of tokens bought
by yourself and a particular number of tokens bought by the other participant, you
have to look up first the row in the table showing the number of ‘tokens you
bought’ and then look for the column to the right showing the number of ‘tokens
wbought by other participant’. In case you buy the same number of tokens as the
other participant it is taken into account that you win the prize with a probability
xof 1r2. As mentioned before, the expected earnings are determined by taking into
Ž .account the probability that you win the prize. Your actual earnings in points are,
wof course, dependent on the outcome of the lottery determining the winner. Your
Ž . xactual earnings in points are, of course, dependent on whether you win the prize.
As indicated before, you will be paid 5 cents for each point you earn. The total
amount of money that will be paid to you after the experiment will, thus, be
Ž .determined by your total earnings over all thirty rounds times 5 cent.
A.3. Use of the computer
On your computer you can now see the screen that will be visible during the
whole experiment. We will explain this screen and the procedures to you by going
through a practice round. Only type something if you are requested to do so.
In the upper left-hand corner of the screen you see that the current ‘round’ and
‘your role’ are indicated. Your role can be either A or B. If you have role A, then
the participant whom you are matched with in that round has role B, and reversely.
Sometimes your role will change from one round to another, on other occasions it
Ž .will stay the same. Your role A or B will only be used to ease the registration of
the results and has no further meaning. Furthermore, observe that for both roles
Ž . Ž .the prize 13 points and the endowment 15 points are indicated. Prize and
endowment are equal for both roles, and will not change over the rounds.
In the upper right-hand corner of the screen you can see how you have to enter
the number of tokens that you want to buy in a period. You type in the number
and press the Enter-key. After having entered the number you will have to wait
until all participants have entered a number. Once every participant has done so,
you will be immediately informed about whether you have won the prize and your
earnings for that round.To illustrate the procedure you are now asked to type in a
number and to press the Enter-key. The number that you enter must not be larger
² :than the endowment. Type in a number and press the Enter-key . Immediately
after everyone has entered the number of tokens, for each pair a lottery will be
wperformed by the computer in accordance with the tokens that are bought. . . . , for
xeach pair the computer will determine who has won the prize. The result is
presented on your screen. This procedure will be followed in each round.
The lower part of the screen offers a results-table. This table gives the results of
all previous rounds. The first column of the table indicates the round. The second
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column shows your role, A or B, in the respective round. The third column gives
the numbers of tokens that you and the other participant bought, indicated via the
role A or B. Column four shows the probabilities with which the prize is won by
you and the other participant, given the numbers of tokens that are bought. The
wsecond to last column indicates who has won the prize. Column four shows who
x Ž .has won the prize. The last column presents the earnings in points for the round.
Note that your role is always indicated in white. In the lower right-hand corner of
the table your total earnings over the rounds are recorded. Your total earnings
determine the money that will eventually be paid to you, since each point earns
you 5 cents. Finally, you can see below the table that you can look up the results
Ž .of, respectively, previous and later rounds by using the arrow keys uprdown or
the PageUp and PageDown keys.
A.4. Summary
In each round you will be randomly matched with one other participant. The
person whom you are paired with changes each round. In each round you have to
decide how many tokens to buy. The numbers of tokens you and the other
participant buy determine the probability with which you will win the prize. In
Ž .accordance with these probabilities the computer performs a drawing lottery
wdetermining the winner of the prize. The one who buys more tokens than the other
wins the prize. If both of you buy the same number of tokens then you have an
xequal probability of 1r2 of winning the prize. Your earnings in points in a round
are determined by the endowment, the number of tokens that you buy, and the
Ž . Ž .outcome of the drawing. Endowment 15 points and prize 13 points are the
same for everyone, and stay the same for all rounds. Each point that you earn
gives you a payoff of 5 cents when the experiment is over. The total amount of
money that will be paid to you is determined by your total earnings times 5 cents,
therefore.
A.5. Final remarks
At the end of today’s session you will be called, one by one, by your table
number to receive your payment in cash in the reception room, privately and
confidentially. Your payment is only your business; you do not have to talk about
it with anyone.
It is not allowed to talk or communicate in any way with other participants
during the experiment. Please, raise your hand if you have a question. I will then
come to your table. In case you have any remarks concerning the experiment or
your decisions, you are requested to use the form labeled ‘REMARKS’, which is
on your table. Shortly, there will be an opportunity to raise questions. Subse-
quently, there will be two practice rounds to make you fully at ease with the
procedures. Your earnings in these rounds do not count for final payment.D stands




















( ) [ ] Ž .Your expected earnings in points Appendix: R s1 sendowmentynumber of tokens you boughtqprobability of winning=price
Tokens you Tokens bought by other participant
bought 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
0 21.5 15.0 15.0 15.0 15.0 15.0 15.0 15.0 15.0 15.0 15.0 15.0 15.0 15.0 15.0 15.0
1 27.0 20.5 18.3 17.3 16.6 16.2 15.9 15.6 15.4 15.3 15.2 15.1 15.0 14.9 14.9 14.8
2 26.0 21.7 19.5 18.2 17.3 16.7 16.3 15.9 15.6 15.4 15.2 15.0 14.9 14.7 14.6 14.5
3 25.0 21.8 19.8 18.5 17.6 16.9 16.3 15.9 15.5 15.3 15.0 14.8 14.6 14.4 14.3 14.2
4 24.0 21.4 19.7 18.4 17.5 16.8 16.2 15.7 15.3 15.0 14.7 14.5 14.3 14.1 13.9 13.7
5 23.0 20.8 19.3 18.1 17.2 16.5 15.9 15.4 15.0 14.6 14.3 14.1 13.8 13.6 13.4 13.3
6 22.0 20.1 18.8 17.7 16.8 16.1 15.5 15.0 14.6 14.2 13.9 13.6 13.3 13.1 12.9 12.7
7 21.0 19.4 18.1 17.1 16.3 15.6 15.0 14.5 14.1 13.7 13.4 13.1 12.8 12.6 12.3 12.1
8 20.0 18.6 17.4 16.5 15.7 15.0 14.4 13.9 13.5 13.1 12.8 12.5 12.2 12.0 11.7 11.5
9 19.0 17.7 16.6 15.8 15.0 14.4 13.8 13.3 12.9 12.5 12.2 11.9 11.6 11.3 11.1 10.9
10 18.0 16.8 15.8 15.0 14.3 13.7 13.1 12.6 12.2 11.8 11.5 11.2 10.9 10.7 10.4 10.2
11 17.0 15.9 15.0 14.2 13.5 12.9 12.4 11.9 11.5 11.2 10.8 10.5 10.2 10.0 9.7 9.5
12 16.0 15.0 14.1 13.4 12.8 12.2 11.7 11.2 10.8 10.4 10.1 9.8 9.5 9.2 9.0 8.8
13 15.0 14.1 13.3 12.6 11.9 11.4 10.9 10.5 10.0 9.7 9.3 9.0 8.8 8.5 8.3 8.0
14 14.0 13.1 12.4 11.7 11.1 10.6 10.1 9.7 9.3 8.9 8.6 8.3 8.0 7.7 7.5 7.3




















( ) [ ] Ž .Your expected earnings in points Appendix: R s` sendowmentynumber of tokens you boughtqprobability of winning=price
Tokens you Tokens bought by other participant
bought 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
0 21.5 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15
1 27 20.5 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14
2 26 26 19.5 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13
3 25 25 25 18.5 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12
4 24 24 24 24 17.5 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11
5 23 23 23 23 23 16.5 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
6 22 22 22 22 22 22 15.5 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9
7 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 14.5 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8
8 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 13.5 7 7 7 7 7 7 7
9 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 12.5 6 6 6 6 6 6
10 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 11.5 5 5 5 5 5
11 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 10.5 4 4 4 4
12 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 9.5 3 3 3
13 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 8.5 2 2
14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 7.5 1
15 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 6.5
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